Criminal justice and police systems are the result of the common social, economical, cultural, and political state. The contemporary Russian criminal justice system and police have complicated history. There are two main sources of the system: first, the old Tsar's system as part of the so-called continental legal system and second, the Soviet „socialistic“ system.
It is clear that the communist regime was absolutely terrible. As a result of the unique experiment to establish a social utopia, the country was thrown onto the path of civilization.
Gorbachev's «Perestroika» (reconstruction) was a necessary attempt to save the power structures by way of reform. A similar attempt was by Khrushchev (the «Thaw»). However, every attempt finished with the political death of its propagators and was followed by stagnation or reaction. With all due credit to Gorbachev, his reforms turned out to be the most radical (freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the multi-party system, the right to hold private property, the lifting of the Iron Curtain, the release of those states occupied by Stalin – Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, etc.). However these reform did not bring an end to the Soviet nightmare.
The disintegration of production and economy continuing. Power still returned to the ruling nomenclature (with new «oligarchs» and criminals); corruption, common in Russia, has taken on a monumental role in all organs of power, establishment and law-enforcement bodies; crisis in the health, education, transport and other social services; crises of spirituality and morality continues; and the militarization of economics and politics also continue.
There is now a growth in the role (importance) of the power structures – FSB (the former KGB), MIA (Ministry of Internal Affairs), and other. The war in Chechnya is a terrifying evidence of neo-totalitarianism. The country also permits human rights abuses on a large scale, particularly in the army and those penal institutions where tyranny and torture dominate (Abramkin, 1998; Christie, 2000: 79-90; Index on Censorship, 1999; Walmsley, 1996: 358-386). Nationalist, anti-Semitic and neofascist groups operate with impunity and meet with no resistance. Attacks against mass media in opposition began in 1999-2000 and continues to date.
The ever-growing economic polarization of the population – visible in the stark contrast between the poor majority and the nouveau riche minority (the «New Russian») – is a guaranteed source of continuing social conflict. The official unemployment rates in Russia were as follows: 1992 – 4.8 % of the able-bodied population; 1993 – 5.5 %; 1994 – 7.4 %; 1995 – 8.9 %; 1996 – 9.6 %; 1997 – 11.9 %; 1998 – 13.3 %; 2003 – 8.9 % (Human Development Report, 1999: 57; Questions of Statistic, 2004: 31). Today, unemployment in Russia stands at 5.2 %. From 2002 to 20 12 the average unemployment rare was 8.3 % (Trading Economics 2013).
Technological backwardness and the absence of competition in domestic production and the service sectors have manifested themselves in the course of the reforms. A consequence of this is the inferiority complex of employees, their de-qualification, marginalization and lumpenization. The excluded population in the face of corruption engages in deviances, including crime (Lenoir, 1974; Paugam, 1996; Finer and Nellis, 1998; Young, 1999).
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